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Science, Eugenics and Utopia 
Comparing scientific humanism and liberal eugenics on human genetic enhancement 
 
Abstract 
 
When we come across the word ‘eugenics’ it is impossible to avoid thinking of Hitler’s 
eugenics and racial project. The latter, however, is hardly representative of eugenics. 
According to the definition provided by the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
eugenics is ‘a scientific attempt to improve the human gene pool’, which includes not 
only genetic engineering technologies but also the practice of husbandry, which some 
scientific utopias proposed to extend to human reproduction already in the seventeenth 
century. This is the historical background inspiring the most important theories of 
eugenics of the twentieth century. In the paper, I will first outline and compare Huxley’s 
centrally planned eugenics to the liberal type of eugenics recently proposed by Nicholas 
Agar. In Huxley’s view, eugenics was a social science with a genetic background, which 
required both public coordination of genetic enhancement and social planning. In contrast, 
Agar argues that, as long as it is entirely left to market regulation, not only eugenics is 
compatible with the liberal ideology but it actually constitutes the ultimate fulfilment of 
liberal society. In spite of remarkable differences, Huxley’s and Agar’s eugenics share 
the same utopian dream of physical and social perfection, which arguably finds its 
origins in the philosophical shift that led Puritan medicine to switch from treating 
human diseases but to improving the performances of the human body. This conception 
later found different expressions, depending on the dominant political ideology of the 
time. As a result, Huxley proposed eugenics in a context of social planning and 
collective internationalism whilst Agar has recently reformulated eugenics in a context 
of liberalism, individualism and market economy. Yet, whether through social planning 
or radical liberalisation, eugenics keeps being a crucial issue in the contemporary 
political agenda, never ceasing to be an inspiring dream as well as a tragic nightmare. 
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‘Imperfections in the environment would vanish and there would be no limitation 
to human longevity, the peaceful existence would extend to human society, which 
would evolve towards a utopian state under the guidance of the saints. […] The 
hard and unrewarding method of Scholasticism would be replaced by a 
revolutionary approach to knowledge in which the public good would take 
precedence over individual gain’.    
J. Stoughton, Felicitas ultimi saeculi, 1640  
 
 
Introduction 
 
When the word ‘eugenics’ appears in any given text or speech, it is impossible 
to avoid thinking of Hitler’s racial eugenic project. This is not due to any intrinsic 
connection between eugenics and the Nazi regime: it is rather due to a historical 
contingency, in fact to the huge historical impact of the Nazi eugenic project. Its 
inglorious and atrocious reputation still causes the almost automatic connection between 
the eugenic practice and Hitler’s racist and cruel regime. However, Hitler’s program of 
eugenics is hardly representative of scientific eugenics. Hitler’s eugenics possessed a 
very low degree of scientific standard but eugenics was, and remains, a scientific 
practice, associated with genetic manipulation and genetic engineering.  
Although the term ‘eugenics’ was coined by Galton in 1883, its origins do not 
date back to the discovery of the DNA nor to the discovery of Mendel’s laws of genetic 
reproduction nor even to Darwin’s theory of evolution. Galton defined eugenics as “the 
science which deals with all influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race” 
(Galton 1909, 35). According to the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, eugenics is 
the attempt to improve the human gene pool (Craig, 1998). If we adopt this broader 
definition and define eugenics as a scientific practice employed to obtain improved 
genetic profiles, eugenics include not only modern genetic engineering technologies but 
also selective and oriented reproductive matches. Generally applied to a wide varieties 
of animal or vegetal beings, this type of eugenics practice is known as husbandry. The 
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first modern proposals to apply husbandry for eugenic purposes to human beings date 
back to the seventeenth century. Not by chance, husbandry was a crucial feature of all 
the utopian plans of the seventeenth century, ranging from Tommaso Campanella’s City 
of the Sun, Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis and Samuel Hartlib’s Universal College. Their 
political projects, in fact, advocated the application of scientific, i.e. experimental and 
repeatable, husbandry not only to animal farming and vegetal varieties but also to 
human beings. 
Their utopias of human and social perfection included husbandry because the 
longevity of the body was one of the most important goals that a utopian society had to 
achieve in order to qualify as a perfect world. Actually, a powerful and often 
millenarian religious background underpinned their utopian vision. Working in London 
during Cromwell’s regime and under the aegis of Hartlib’s leadership, the Puritan 
scientists believed that science, including husbandry and medicine, was a tool provided 
by the Divine Grace to enable humanity to return to the state of perfection enjoyed by 
Adam and Eve in Heaven (C. Webster, 1975). 
Their scientific ardour aimed at restoring the Paradise on Earth and consequently 
targeted all the dimensions of human life. They aimed at reforming the society through a 
new conception of politics, education and demography as well as achieving human mastery 
over nature through physics, chemistry and biology. Finally, they pursued human physical 
perfection and unlimited longevity through medicine and husbandry. Whilst medicine 
applied to the preservation and restoration of human health, husbandry aimed at producing 
more resistant human beings, with enhanced physical performance and capable of living 
longer without falling victim to any disease. According to Hartlib, medicine and husbandry 
might have granted humanity the possibility to achieve the longevity of the Patriarchs. 
Although not knowing about Mendel’s laws or the structure of human DNA, these pioneer 
scientists knew the basic principles regulating reproduction matches and outcomes and tried 
to use them in a scientific way, combining a basic experimental approach with a systematic 
comparison of the outcomes.  
In the broad definition hereby employed, eugenics was not just a key feature of 
the scientific utopias of the time but it also was inextricably linked to the emergence of 
science itself. Consequently, I felt it was necessary to recall briefly the origins and the 
salient features of the eugenics practice not only to show the mere contingency of the 
association between eugenics and Hitler’s regime but also to reaffirm its intellectual 
background, utopian and scientific at the same time. I understand that coupling the word 
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science with the word utopia may induce surprise. Science is usually associated with 
rationality, objectivity, universality and neutrality. However, the objectivity and the 
universality of medicine do not stand in contrast with the utopian dreams of perfection 
sustaining the various medical practices. It is indeed possible to believe in the ultimate 
achievement of human unlimited longevity whilst practising medicine in a very rigorous 
and scientific way.  
Here I should may be devote a short paragraph to the definition of utopia, not so 
much to develop and adopt a universal definition, given how controversial the term is, 
but rather to explain and define the working definition I chose to employ in the paper. A 
Utopia, (u-topos: nowhere), usually indicate a perfect world, located nowhere on this 
planet and still not only definitely conceivable but also, at least to some extent, 
realizable. There have been various forms of utopian thinking – from religious to 
philosophical ones, including ideological utopias such as marxism and scientific utopias 
such as Comte’s scientism – depending on what kind of knowledge was deemed crucial 
to the formulation and implementation of a perfect society. However, the utopian 
thinkers are generally labelled as such by their opponents rather than by themselves. 
Actually, the so called utopian thinkers usually propose their vision of the future world 
not so much as a pure speculative exercise but as an improved version of the present 
society. In other words, utopian proposals are not the results of speculative imagination 
but of a careful observation of the present state of affairs and of an equally accurate 
programme of actions and requirements that are deemed necessary to remove present 
inequalities and inefficiencies so as to obtain a future society free from current limits 
and therefore perfect.  
One might argue that, under current definition, any progressive thought may be 
defined as utopian. Yet, the utopian visions are also characterised by an escathological 
framework, which works as a motivational force and induce the utopian thinkers to 
believe in the unique value of their own proposal, not only vis-à-vis present alternatives 
but also vis-à-vis future alternatives. That is, the utopian thinkers present their utopian 
vision both as the perfect and the final stage of human history. This double belief, that is 
intrinsic perfection and the end of history, usually leads a utopian thinker to consider the 
establishment of the utopian society as the ultimate result of a series of political, social 
and technological actions wholly tuned to the achievement of the ultimate perfection. 
The utopian programmes rarely come to be implemented as they were originally 
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formulated but their visionary power as well as their motivational appeal do influence 
the actual developments of social behaviours, practices, structures and institutions.  
Coming back to the previous example of Puritan’s utopia, for instance, we can 
easily realise that even if the actual utopian programme of Hartlib’s circle never came into 
existence, it constituted a major force behind the emergence of modern science and 
modern medicine. In fact, the new Puritan religious framework provided humankind with 
entirely new tasks and responsibilities vis-à-vis the Creation. Humanity was no longer a 
mere guardian of God’s creation for it had to not only preserve God’s creation but also 
improve it. Whilst classical and medieval medicine focused on the restoration of the 
physical equilibrium that sickness had disrupted, the medicine developed by the Puritan 
scientists pursued explicitly physical amelioration and unlimited prolongation of life. 
Only in this framework, science could manage to acquire the remarkable social status it 
possessed when Charles II created the Royal Society. Without this crucial shift in the 
religious and spiritual approach occurred in Germany, England and Bohemia during the 
first half of the seventeenth century, thus, the history and development of modern science 
and medicine would have been substantially different. 
The utopian background of medicine and eugenics, however, did not disappear 
with the secularisation process. We find examples of eugenic ideals in Turgot as well as 
in Comte. As soon as science and its methods extended to the social sciences and to the 
spiritual domain, the pursuit of human perfection continued being the utopian horizon that 
sustained medical and eugenic practices. In this immanent version, the pursuit of human 
perfection actually extended to the religious domain through the proposal of an explicit 
plan of human divinisation (Comte, The Catechism of Positive Religion, 2004 [1891]).  
This is the philosophical and historical background informing and inspiring one of 
the most important eugenic scientists of the twentieth century, Julian Huxley. In the 
following section, I will outline and discuss Huxley’s theory of eugenics, which is 
currently upheld by the I.H.E.U. (International Humanist Ethical Union), an NGO 
founded by Huxley himself in 1952. In the subsequent section, I will turn my attention 
towards the most important contemporary theory of eugenics, namely Nicholas Agar’s 
liberal eugenics. I will then try to compare the two approaches, outlining and discussing 
their relative similarities and differences not only in theoretical terms but also in relation 
to some of the current developments in genetic engineering and biotechnology.  
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A social science with a genetic background 
 
Huxley’s eugenic project, in a sense, is the natural development of his intra-
mundane religion based on science. Huxley firmly believed Europe was facing an 
inexorable “racial degeneration” mainly caused by a “lowering of the rigorous standard 
of the laws of natural selection” (Huxley, 1931: 100). As a result, Huxley argued that 
eugenic policies were necessary to restore and accelerate the proper flow of evolution. 
In Huxley’s view – and the recent scientific discoveries seem to confirm his ideas – the 
human personality was the result of the interaction between genetic outfits and social 
environment. Incorporating both genetic experiments and social changes, eugenics, 
therefore, was not a natural science but a social science supported by the scientific 
background of genetics (Huxley, 1950: 26). 
At first, Huxley distinguished short and long-range eugenics. Short-range 
eugenics dealt with an alteration of the proportion of outstanding people in the whole of 
the “human stock”. A slow improvement in this direction would make it easy to 
establish a long-range eugenic strategy. The latter could in turn achieve the highest 
religious goal: improve the quality of “human stock”, bring a new type of humankind 
into existence and achieve human perfection (Huxley, 1931: 93).  
Although it might sound visionary, such a programme had very concrete 
implications. First, it implied a strict control over reproduction procedures through the 
strict separation between the social and the individual side of sex and reproduction. 
Even though sex was essential to intimate relationships of love, from a eugenic 
perspective it was to be separated from reproduction. The latter was a social activity and 
must be devoted to the universal improvement of humankind (Huxley, 1964: 50). 
Second, Huxley suggested preventing mentally “defective people”, as well as all people 
lacking valuable “intellectual qualities” such as the members of the working class, from 
‘breeding’, if necessary through sterilisation (Huxley, 1931: 88-92). The policy of 
genetic improvement was meant to follow and complement these initial measures. The 
society, he argued, should encourage the ‘breeding’ of those with desirable qualities in 
order to ensure a balanced variety of talented people, such as poets, scientists and 
musicians, at all times. In this respect, eugenics was the avant-garde of all sciences and 
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could help humankind to fulfil its main purpose: the exercise of total control over its 
own evolutionary destiny (Huxley, 1931: 130). 
Being aware that even very similar genetic outfits could develop differently 
depending on the social environment, Huxley suggested to combine eugenic measures 
with social and political reforms to ensure the most rapid and effective plan of eugenic 
improvement. In Huxley’s vision, the reform of the environment not only ensured the 
perfect development of the individual personality but allowed the social and political 
authorities to discover the “defective” elements in the “human stock”. More 
specifically, the failure of some individuals to live up to the evolutionary standards in a 
eugenic environment could only be due to their defective genetic outfit. Once 
recognised and isolated, these individuals would be prevented from ‘breeding’ and this 
would increase the speed of the human improvement process (Huxley, 1950: 44).  
As a result, Huxley fiercely criticised the capitalist society of his time, arguing 
that it was a highly dysgenic environment for two main reasons. First, it neglected 
potentially outstanding people of the lower classes by refusing them the opportunity to 
fully develop their intellectual and physical potentiality. Second, its health care system 
did not help to eliminate harmful genetic profiles (Huxley, 1950: 46). It would have 
made little sense to apply a eugenic policy to this social environment because increasing 
the percentage of genetically outstanding people to the point where the society would be 
unable to incorporate them would only increase their frustration. In contrast, enforcing a 
new type of social and political environment in the absence of eugenic measures would 
not reduce the number of people genetically inadequate (Huxley, 1950: 42). The ideal 
environment, thus, was one in which a eugenic policy would improve both the genetic 
outfit of the population and the overall social conditions. In fact, eugenic policies and 
the reform of the social context were not sufficient unless followed by the rejection of 
nationalism and the establishment of a supranational authority. Huxley went as far as to 
suggest that international organisations such as the UN and UNESCO should enforce 
eugenics programmes in order to reverse a trend of racial degeneration (Huxley, 1964: 
252, 267). During his UNESCO Directorate, Huxley addressed the problem of eugenics 
in this way: 
“Thus even though it is quite true that any radical eugenic policy will be 
for many years politically and psychologically impossible, it will be 
important for UNESCO to see that the eugenic problem is examined with 
the greatest care, and that the public mind is informed of the issues at stake 
so that much that now is unthinkable may at least become thinkable.” 
(Huxley 1947) 
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 It might be argued that eugenics was very much a common idea among scientists 
during the Thirties and the Forties and that Julian Huxley simply joined an already large 
and dynamic group of people in those years. However, he firmly adhered to his beliefs 
and published essays on eugenics right up to the very end of his life. Writing in 1964, 
Huxley intended to re-evaluate his previous account of scientific humanism and to 
develop it within the new context of the Cold War. Using the words of Theilhard De 
Chardin 1 , Huxley affirmed that humankind’s evolution had left the biosphere and 
entered the noosphere, the realm of the human mind. Looking up into the noosphere it 
would be possible to “see the Promised Land beyond” (Huxley, 1964: 81). 
In this publication, Huxley renamed his philosophy ‘evolutionary humanism’. 
The latter rested on three progressive and intetwined pillars evolving through history: 
art, science and religion. Art dealt with significance, science with knowledge and 
religion with spiritual perfection. Art could provide a qualitative enrichment of life in a 
process of discovery and extension of the self, opening the doors to a world where mind 
and quality would transcend matter and quantity. This world was the upper world, in 
contrast to the world of everyday life as well as to what he called the lower world, i.e. 
the visionary state of mind provoked by the consumption of drugs. Science was the 
second pillar: its task was to increase human control over the outer world. Huxley 
affirmed that science was as creative as art: the scientific laws did not exit independently 
of the human mind but were the result of human creativity applied to the explanation of 
natural phenomena.  Science was a self-enlarging and self-correcting system, which had 
experienced an “irresistible trend towards the creation of one comprehensive scientific 
picture of the world of man’s experience”(Huxley, 1964:110). Such a trend had extended 
the relevance of science first to the realm of ethics and then to religion itself to the point 
that science was ready to become a new theology for a new universal religious framework 
for the human sense of reverence. Science was, indeed, a “new revelation” (Huxley, 1964: 
223-224).  
Religion was the third pillar. Huxley redefined religion as a type of ‘spiritual 
ecology’ dealing with the relationship between man and his internal nature. The new 
humanist religion preserved the sense of sacredness and the importance of religious 
experience, although rephrased in an immanent, psychological frame. Religion still 
                                                 
1 T. De Chardin, a contemporary Jesuit and a scientist who made an attempt to reconcile Christianity and 
the theory of evolution, see  “The Phenomenon of Man”, Collins 1959 
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needed a divinity but a divinity without god. What should this divinity be? Huxley had 
no doubt: the highest purpose of religion was the “divinization of human existence” 
(Huxley, 1964:113). Being responsible for the fulfilment of its destiny of “divinisation”, 
humankind had the opportunity to bring the “transcendent world”, which he understood 
as a perfect version of the imperfect present, into concrete existence (Huxley, 1964:115). 
The word ecology entered the writings of Huxley relatively late, but it turned out 
to have a great influence on his thoughts. Apart from the traditional ecology, focused on 
the relation between humankind and the environment, Huxley also mentioned spiritual 
ecology and educational ecology. The latter was concerned with human beings and their 
inner selves; educational ecology dealt with the relationships between the individual and 
his/her fellow human beings, bridging the divide between intellectual instruction and 
moral formation. In this way, education could both develop well-integrated personalities 
(psychological task) and build an evolutionary social environment (social task). At the 
completion of these three ecological revolutions, evolutionary humanism would unite 
all humankind into a global community with a common philosophy, culture and religion. 
Although he was confident that the end of the Cold War would give his evolutionary 
humanism another chance, Julian Huxley did not live long enough to see the Berlin 
Wall fall to pieces. He died on the 14th of February 1975, one year after publishing the 
two volumes of his recollections.  
 In sum, Julian Huxley’s concept of eugenics is a key component of his overall 
intellectual framework, in which humanity pursues the achievement of human 
perfection. Eugenics is one of the various scientific activities devoted to this task, 
namely the science dealing with the enhancement of human physical and intellectual 
performances. Other scientific activities, like medicine or physics, had to contribute to 
their own field, say health care and energy. Eugenics was part of a scientific political 
utopia in which science was expected to solve all the problems, shortcomings and 
inefficiencies of the human society, from spiritual dissatisfaction to the prolongation of 
human life. It is important to point pout that in Huxley’s eugenics there is no trace of 
racism. His eugenic suggestions, however politically controversial, were always 
perfectly compatible with the sound and rigorous scientific standards of his time. In 
Huxley’s view, it was time to approach human evolution from its real perspective: that 
of the species homo sapiens sapiens. Consequently, Huxley rejected any reference to 
human races; he was actually a member of the group of scientists to whom UNESCO 
asked in 1955 to elaborate a scientific declaration against racism. Very much along this 
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line, Huxley also rejected relativism, nationalism and cultural ethnicity, because they 
simply constituted obstacles to the realisation of the perfect world society his universal 
evolutionary humanism promised to deliver. Finally, in Huxley’s theory of eugenics, 
both private individuals and public authorities (not necessarily the state) were expected 
to actively cooperate to the ultimate task of enhancing both the human species and the 
society in which this species had to live.  
 
The ultimate fulfilment of individual liberty  
 
 Julian Huxley was at the same time a biologist and a science popularizer, a 
spiritual leader and a social reformer. He served as General Director of UNESCO for 
some years, contributed to the drafting of its constitution, founded the IHEU and 
actively participated to the World Eugenic Society. Nicholas Agar is a philosopher, 
teaches at the Victoria University of Wellington and has recently written one of the 
most intriguing and challenging defence of eugenic practices. His moral arguments and 
suggestions, however, differ remarkably from Julian Huxley’s eugenics propositions. 
Agar is, first and foremost, an advocate of liberalism. His main task, therefore, is to 
show not only that eugenic practices are compatible with the liberal ideology but also 
that they actually constitute the ultimate fulfilment of the basic moral imperative of 
liberalism: the achievement of the highest possible degree of human liberty and 
autonomy. Although belonging to different philosophical traditions, both Huxley and 
Agar pursue essentially the realisation of a perfect society, in which eugenics is 
expected to play a crucial role. In Huxley’s perfect society, centrally planned eugenic 
measures subjected every single individual to the achievement of the common good. In 
contrast, in Agar’s liberal eugenics society, the common good flows from the 
independent efforts of every single individual pursuing his/her self-realisation through 
unrestricted access to genetic enhancement techniques. Yet, it is intriguing that both 
philosophers looked at eugenics as one of the most effective practice to facilitate their 
ultimate goals of perfection.  
In Liberal Eugenics (2004), Agar argues that liberal eugenics, in contrast to state 
eugenics, will not reduce but actually increase freedom of choice and individual liberty. 
Agar formulates a clear distinction between a liberal eugenics, which is scientifically 
sound and enhances individual freedom, and a racist eugenics, which is scientifically 
flawed and encourages discrimination. Agar tries to defend the liberalisation of eugenic 
 11
 
 
practices in two steps. First he tries to show that liberal eugenics is not associated with 
authoritarian, racist regimes imposing eugenic reproductive models. Second, he argues 
that liberal eugenics is worth of defence because it enlarges reproductive choices and 
give human beings new instruments and possibilities currently unavailable. In Agar’s 
view, the exclusion of public authorities from the reproductive mechanisms ensures that 
the unrestrained fulfilment of the reproductive choices of private individuals may even 
enlarge the variety and diversity of phenotypes and genotypes of the human population.  
In one of his examples, Agar mentions the famous deaf lesbian couple that used the 
sperm donated by a deaf man to make sure that the child born would also be deaf.  
 The main methodology employed by Agar is the use of moral images. Agar 
proposes to evaluate the moral implications of innovative technologies or situations by 
applying to them the same moral images we currently apply to traditional and familiar 
technologies or situations. If, according to the extension of a moral image, the 
traditional and the innovative situations look similar there is no reason why the 
permission – or the prohibition – associated with the traditional situation should not be 
extended to the innovative one.  
 Agar is fully aware of the new technologies and of their potential applications 
and limits. Just to mention some of them: pre-natal and pre-implantation screening, pre-
implantation manipulation and enhancement, and human cloning. Some of these 
technologies are already available and operative, like the pre-natal and pre-implantation 
screening. The latter belong to negative eugenics, i.e. to the section of eugenics aiming 
at reducing the amount of ‘defective’ human stock, as Huxley would say. Positive 
eugenics, such as pre-implantation manipulation and enhancement, are available and 
operative only in relation to some vegetal and animal species. The current genetic 
engineering technologies have so far accomplished minor achievements in the animal 
world, such as the engineering of hyper-intelligent mice and the cloning of a variety of 
animals, the first of which was the sheep Dolly. The situation is altogether different in 
relation to the vegetal world, where a great number of genetically modified varieties 
have been created, planted and, in some cases, successfully commercialised. In any 
event, the prospect of a more or less immediate commercialisation does not affect the 
method of moral images, by which it is possible to evaluate any innovative technology – 
even when far from being actually implemented – as long as there is a moral image that 
can be extended onto it. 
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 Before entering Agar’s moral arguments, however, it is necessary to outline his 
concept of human evolution as well as his concept of human society and human 
personality. His defence of eugenics, in fact, starts from a clear description of human 
evolution. In his historical reconstruction, the human species began its evolution 
through the natural selection mechanism, in which the environment was more or less 
stable and the human species gradually adapted to it. The outcome of this phase of 
human evolution was the emergence of the Homo sapiens sapiens. The latter in turn 
began to evolve through a progressive adaptation of the environment to his/her needs. 
The outcome of this phase was the development of human civilisation, of which liberal 
democracy and scientific development constitute the latest outcomes. With the 
advancement of genetic engineering and biotechnologies, however, the human species 
has entered the third phase of its evolutionary trajectory, in which it may be possible to 
engineer simultaneously genetic and social variations. In this respect, sharing with 
Huxley the same interpretation of human evolution, Agar reaches the same conclusions. 
In Huxley’s theory of eugenics, the final phase, in which humanity could deal 
simultaneously with social variations and genetic engineering, was actually named 
‘psychosocial’ evolution.  In any event, the ‘three phases’ argument is far from being 
innovative and simply reaffirms the general interpretation of human progress originally 
formulated by Turgot, Condorcet and Comte.  
 As to human personality, Agar is also aware of the scientific flaws of genetic 
reductionism and affirms that human personality is always the result of the interaction 
between nature and nurture. Actually, his argument is that, provided that the aims are 
similar, it is legitimate to operate at the level of nurture as well as at the level of nature. 
In his view, the importance of nurture should be sufficient to dissipate any fear related 
to human cloning: two cloned individuals are less similar than two twins are. Here, the 
main difference between Huxley and Agar is that the latter would not consider 
legitimate any intervention by public authorities, whilst Huxley argued that such 
intervention was not only legitimate but also necessary. The reason why Huxley 
reached this conclusion was that the simultaneous intervention on nature and nurture 
required a rational and centralised planning to avoid discrepancies and lack of 
effectiveness. I will come back to this point at the end, because it seems to me that 
Huxley’s argument constitutes the most powerful critique of Agar’s liberal eugenics.  
 Once established that nature and nurture keep sharing the responsibility in 
constituting human personalities, Agar moves on applying the methodology of moral 
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images to both our current images of nature and of nurture. The first point is crucial: it 
is actually true there is nothing intrinsically moral in the current view of nature, which 
is based on the random distribution of genetic characteristics provided by both human 
reproduction and unpredictable natural genetic mutations. There is nothing intrinsically 
moral in the genetic profile of the Homo sapiens sapiens as it has evolved so far. It is 
the result of a random process of natural selection and adaptation, which has developed 
certain physical characteristics rather than others. Along this line, there is no moral 
difference in selective breeding and genetically modified food. In this respect, actually 
Agar seems to be right: having no intention nature cannot be moral. If anything, we 
have derived some of our moral values from this specific model of human being. Agar 
point is that in order to claim successfully that changing our genetic profile is morally 
wrong we should be able to demonstrate that preserving it is morally right. Moreover, 
Agar insists that the same species that has been morally able to separate sex from 
reproduction may as well separate reproduction from sex. Consequently, from a moral 
point of view separating reproduction from sex is as legitimate as engineering new 
versions of the Homo sapiens sapiens.  
 The process of human genetic engineering, therefore, may also extend to 
enhancement. Agar distinguishes not only between medical and enhancing genetic 
engineering techniques but also between the techniques improving the physical 
conditions of given individuals and the techniques giving birth to altogether different 
individuals. In the first case, all the medical techniques improving the future quality of 
life of the prospect children feature as legitimate. As long as they improve certain 
characteristics without impairing others, medical genetic engineering may include 
enhancing techniques. In the second, case, the techniques give birth to altogether 
different individuals therefore the Kantian moral argument that forbids treating 
individuals as means and not as ends simply does not apply. In this case, eugenics is not 
discriminating between two prospect individuals but giving birth to a specific one.  
The same Kantian argument applies to nurture. The risk associated with using 
enhancing techniques usually relates to the expectations that parents inevitably come to 
place over their genetically engineered children. Using the moral image of education, 
Agar insists that if we accept parents influencing the future career, education, life-style 
of their children there is no logical reason to prevent them from boosting some their 
genetic characteristics. In his view, the genetic enhancement of intelligence, for instance, 
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does not put more pressure on a child than sending him/her to Oxford: they can always 
choose a different career.  
Although I will outline and develop my criticism later in the paper, here I would 
like to raise one specific point. It is true, as Agar points out, that if we are allowed to 
influence the future career of our children through the modification of environmental 
conditions we may as well do it through genetic enhancement. However, parents’ 
control over the environmental conditions is limited and subjected to social and political 
control, that is to say is always the result of a negotiation between their will, the will of 
their children and the social context. Unless we accept a similar control in the 
reproductive practices, genetic enhancement would remain totally under the control of 
parents. Moreover, their choices are irreversible. My point is that genetic enhancement, 
like educational choices, presupposes intentions, which in turn imply responsibility and 
accountability. Whilst our society has developed ways to measure and enforce parents’ 
accountability for the educational choices of their children, at present we have not 
developed any similar mechanisms for genetic choices.  
In fact, in the post-liberal future of a eugenic society, Agar accepts some 
regulating principles. He is aware that the liberalisation of eugenic measures may 
produce some perverse social consequences, which might put at risk the survival of 
current social structures. More specifically, he is worried that eugenics practices may 
produce polarisation and homogenisation. In the first case, eugenics may cause both 
intrinsic polarisation and a polarisation caused by differential access. The first type of 
polarisation should be limited by the principle that parents may intervene genetically 
only to increase the future choices of career and personality of their offspring. As to the 
second type of polarisation, eugenic treatments may produce classes of individuals so 
different that they will no longer consider each other fellow citizens. In other words, 
Agar suggests that differential access to eugenics treatments may cause a collapse of 
human solidarity, leading the genetically enriched to look at the genetically natural as 
we look today at apes. Obviously, the public authority regulating access to eugenic 
treatments should operate as to avoid such developments. Yet, as long as human beings 
will be able to recognise each other as member of the same species, Agar defends the 
polarisation due to differential access. The current liberal acceptance of the social 
stratification due to differential access to education, job opportunities and medical 
treatments implies the analogous acceptance of differential access to eugenic treatments. 
Actually, Agar is optimistic about the future prospects of eugenic treatments. First, the 
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gradual diffusion of eugenic treatments will make them cheaper and accessible, the 
genetically worse-off will be progressively reduced and, in the end, the polarisation will 
be reduced rather than increased.  
Agar’s arguments against homogenisation, however, are a little weaker. He is 
confident that the principle restricting eugenics treatments to those increasing the future 
choices of children is sufficient to prevent the homogenisation of the population. 
Unfortunately, enhancing parents operate in order to realise their procreative visions, 
which are always the result of a projection of their wishes onto the society in which they 
live. They will use eugenic enhancement to make sure that their children will be 
successful in a specific social context: this may not restrict choices to one single model 
but it will not result either in a wider range of models than nature currently offers. Agar 
admits that a society in which black people will not be discriminated is the ideal goal, 
but he concedes that, as the latter is difficult to realise, we could as well let parents 
choose the skin colours of their children. He insists that they will not necessarily choose 
white skin, which might actually be true. Yet, I do no really see how the freedom of 
choice here may even increase the variety of human phenotypes. In fact, evidences from 
the industry of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) suggests that the 
commercialisation of enhanced varieties of vegetal products has drastically reduced 
biodiversity. It is obviously controversial to extend this conclusion to human beings, but 
it is equally controversial to assume that choices will increase instead of shrink. 
In addition, Agar is aware that parents making genetic choices for their offspring 
may actually endanger them in a future context. His argument, however, is disappointing: 
if we let parents bring their children to dangerous motorways why should we prohibit the 
experimental risks associated with genetic engineering? Here I do not want to touch upon 
the various moral counter-arguments. I just wish to focus on a social one: we can accept 
parents carrying their children along risky motorways because we have a social and legal 
system that hold parents accountable for what happens to their children. Unless Agar 
accepts the idea of developing analogous systems related to eugenics treatments, I do not 
see how he could possibly extend the moral image of the motorways to the risky 
enhancing practices.  
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Huxley Vs Agar: how liberal can eugenics be ? 
 
In the liberal eugenics society, not only the genetically based diseases will 
progressively disappear but also the overall human population will be genetically 
‘better’. Now, Agar claims that ‘better’ does not imply the success of any standards or 
conformist model but actually a remarkable increase of varieties and models, which 
would outnumber the actual variety produced by the natural reshuffling of genetic 
profiles. This is, I believe, one of the weakest points of Agar’s utopian vision. The point 
is that prospective parents choose the genetic enhancement of certain physical traits 
always in relation to a specific social and cultural environment, in which their children 
are expected to live. A light skin colour only makes sense in a society that discriminates 
black people. The removal of the alleged genes of homosexuality only makes sense in a 
society that discriminates homosexual people in the very same way in which an anti-
nicotine gene only makes sense in a society where tobacco consumption is a problem. It 
may be true that parents’ choice will not be reduced to one single model, like the Arian 
race, but it is highly unlikely that, if the state keeps out, the variety will improve. Trends, 
fashion, social conditioning, conformism and class stratification already reduce 
drastically the potential development of an individual and it is difficult, rebus sic 
stantibus, to see how genetic enhancement may invert these trends.  
I will now try to formalize my last assertion by using a very simple model of 
game theory, where we have two players A and B. A is player One, and represents the 
collectivity which, for simplicity, we assume to behave consistently as a single actor. B 
is player Two and has to decide whether to adopt eugenic measures to improve the 
genetic profile of his/her offsprings. Now, A has two options: yes or no, which have to 
be matched with similar options of B. Here it is the extensive form of the game:  
 
     A 
 
          Y          N 
 B   -------------------    
  Y              N           Y              N 
            (2, 2)     (2, -2)        (0, 6)      (0, 0)       
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Let us examine briefly the various options, and their relative payoffs. If we 
assume that eugenics becomes legal and perfectly available, player A may choose or 
refuse to adopt eugenic measures. If A chooses to adopt eugenics measures, our player 
B may conform and obtain the same payoffs of all the others (2, 2), or may refuse to 
conform and being discriminate (2, -2). Given the disparities in numbers, to player A 
the choice of B is indifferent. If player A chooses not to employ eugenic measures, 
player B may conform and the situation remains unaltered (0,0) or may take advantage 
and adopt eugenic measures (0,6), which is an option very rewarding given that player 
B will be the only one enjoying genetic enhancement. Therefore we have:  
           Player B 
                    Y                        N 
                                                                              
2, 2 2, -2 
0, 6 0, 0 
Player A                               Y 
(people)                                N 
 
 
Now given the previous assumptions, it is clear that the Nash equilibrium is 
reached at Y;Y (2, 2), which is a dominant strategy because no matter what A chooses, 
for player B is always better to choose Y (Yes).  
Yet, the unlikely increase of individual choice is far from being the only problem 
with Agar’s argument. Agar is right when he argues that in the concept of nature we 
have developed so far there is nothing intrinsically moral. Yet, the social context in 
which we live derives from this specific version of human nature. Any changes we 
engineer in the nature of human beings will most probably also affect the relative social 
conception. Now, as Agar seems to be fond of moral images, let me use the moral 
image of doping to illustrate this better. In our society, the achievements in sport 
practices are highly valued only when they are the result of hard training and 
commitment. If there is an intervention of doping drugs, the same results not only do 
not impress but also they are blamed. In this context, genetic enhancement looks very 
similar to doping drugs. It is true that different individuals do not start from the same 
level: some people naturally produce more EPO than others. Yet, this does not affect 
our social definition of sport activities because the genetic benefits are randomly 
distributed and without intentional plans. There is nothing intrinsically moral in this 
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specific definition of sport practices but it is clear that the genetic engineering of 
physical traits favourable to sport activities will indeed change our conception of sport.  
This argument leads us to the core problem raised by Agar’s liberal eugenics 
utopia and brings us back to Huxley’s theory of eugenics. Agar’s main argument is that, 
as long as the state keeps out, the liberalisation of eugenics practices will not alter the 
overall social structure. In fact, he adds, it will allow the liberal society to achieve its 
ultimate realisation because it will increase individual choice. In other words, Agar 
denies the spillover effect by which private practices will affect and modify social 
structures. Now, Julian Huxley’s theory of eugenics makes clear why this is untenable.  
Even Agar agrees that the large majority of human characteristics of great value today, 
such as intelligence, beauty, physical strength or success, are the result of the interaction 
between various genes and the social and cultural environment in which we live. 
Therefore, to obtain significant results the mere genetic enhancement is not sufficient: it 
is also necessary to shape the social and cultural environment in such a way that the 
genetic enhanced individuals could maximise their success. The action of coordination 
between genetic engineering and social reforms is necessary to ensure a consistent 
development of a eugenic society.  
Huxley knew that similar genetic outfits could develop differently depending on 
the social environment. The perfect eugenic society, thus, was one in which favourable 
social conditions were combined with a programme of eugenic control over the 
reproduction of the population. Huxley was not especially fond of governmental 
intervention and he knew the enormous risks associated with national eugenics 
programmes, as he was aware of Nazi eugenics programmes. However, he knew that 
social and political reforms were necessary to make sure that eugenics enhancement 
would yield relevant results. Without social and political intervention, the eugenic 
enhancement advantages would increase social discrimination without being effective.   
Consequently, the same people that have invested so much in enhancing the genetic 
profile of their children will probably lobby to make sure that such investments will be 
eventually successful. For instance, they may actively encourage the introduction of 
policies of genetic discrimination. They may support health policies that actively foster 
eugenic selection to reduce the public health costs by selecting individuals less vulnerable 
to diseases like diabetes, cancer or ischemia. The liberal eugenic approach is probably 
right when it forecasts that the liberalisation of the new biotechnologies will not trigger 
social and political change along the traditional upside-down system, in which the 
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political authority imposes reproductive modalities and genetic standards to passive 
citizens. However, social and political change will indeed be promoted along the bottom-
up system, in which political lobbies, economic and financial actors, pharmaceutical 
corporations and patient groups will exercise pressure on the political authority in order to 
have their interests acknowledged and fostered.  
Some examples may clarify this point. Social discrimination already exists: it will not 
be introduced by the liberalisation of eugenic practices. The state cannot force white people 
to marry black people but can try to avoid white entrepreneurs to adopt discriminating 
policies in their hiring procedures. The liberalisation of eugenic practices may suggest 
alternative ways to solve social discrimination, i.e. by removing physical traits considered 
negative by the social dominant paradigms. What is true of skin colour may equally apply 
to other features, like height, gender, intelligence and so forth and so on. 
In case the liberalisation of eugenic techniques does not involve public authorities, 
eugenics will increase social discrimination and cause a substantial shift in western social 
models of health care, hiring procedures and social participation. The emphasis will no 
longer be on social responsibility and public services but will be placed on individual 
responsibility. The health care focus may switch from public access to medical treatment 
to the genetic improvement of the population. The concerns raised by environmental 
degradation may switch the public policy focus from reducing pollution to increase 
human resistance. The social focus on alcoholism, depression, drug-addiction, mental 
illnesses may neglect the collective factors and turn its emphasis on individual will and 
genetic factors. In a word, the extension of human intervention to the genetic identity of 
an individual may well be morally acceptable but may as well radically change the social 
and political structures in which we live.   
It may come as a surprise to the reader, but these social changes are already taking 
place as I write. Let me just mention some concrete examples, which support the 
likelihood of the transformations above mentioned well before the large majority of 
Agar’s eugenic treatments may reach commercialisation. The increased concern on the 
genetic roots of many of our common diseases coupled with the promises of a 
‘personalised medicine’ is shifting research and clinical priorities towards entirely new 
health care models, based on the narrative of ‘individual choice’ (Petersen 2006; Newman 
& Vidler 2006). Research priorities, and therefore research funds, are increasingly 
concerned with biotechnology and genetic diagnostic and engineering (Kaufert 2000). 
The interest upon the environmental and social factors related to the emergence and 
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diffusion of diseases like cancer, diabetes, alzheimer is fading away, leaving this field of 
research with scarcity of  funds and resources. The biotechnology sector, within which 
the genetic research is dominant, has recently become the most funded among all the 
research sectors funded by the European Commission. The OECD Report on the most 
recent R&D trends in biotechnology confirms that it is becoming one of most important 
economic sector for research and development as well as for sales and patent 
applications, growth and commercial potential. Within the biotech industry, the health 
sector is clearly the most important: it enjoys the large majority of funds, of 
employment, of sales and of R&D investments.  
Some recent studies have focused on how the new biomedical technologies produce 
remarkable consequences even before their large-scale implementation. According to 
Clarke at al. (2003), the Western world is facing an increasingly pervasive social, cultural 
and political phenomenon named biomedicalisation. In their study, they show how the 
emergence of the new biotechnologies made a remarkable contribution to the transition 
from medicalisation to biomedicalisation, which is transforming the concept of ‘health’ 
into “an individual responsibility to be fulfilled through improved access to knowledge, 
self surveillance, prevention, risk assessment and the consumption of self help biomedical 
goods and services”. Consequently, biomedicalisation is encouraging an extension of 
medical jurisdiction, in the sense that various aspects of human life previously outside 
medical jurisdictions come to be constructed as medical problems. Second, it is 
engineering a process of commodification of health, whereby the Health Care sector has 
not only increased its GNP share from 4% to 13% but also encouraged a  switch of the 
responsibility of disease treatment from the social system to the individual consumer.  
The large investments made by the public sector are socialising the costs of 
research and technology advancement without socialising its profits, usually enjoyed by 
the pharmaceutical corporations patenting new drugs that are often the result of years of 
research conducted on public funds. The parallel reduction of public investments in 
‘ordinary’ academic research and didactic activities is forcing the academic system to 
rely more and more on the funds provided by the private foundations and corporations, 
re-orienting their research agenda to the issues and needs of the funding agencies. 
Moreover, the increased centralisation of medical care centres, often merged under 
the control of large pharmaceutical corporations, is producing higher efficiency but also 
higher costs for both the medical insurance companies, which are increasing their tariffs, 
and the public health care system, which pays higher bills. In turn, biomedicalization is 
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reinforcing the social stratification related to the access to health care provisions. Whilst 
the upper middle class is being co-opted into new biomedical practices, the classes with 
lower income are being excluded from basic health provisions or co-opted into various 
forms of limitations, with regards, for example, to reproduction and birth control. As a 
result, pharmaceutical corporations and insurance companies are having an increasing 
impact on the boundaries between the normal and the pathological (P. Conrad, 2005).  
 Petersen (2006) has argued that the new genetic technologies, apart from 
potentially affecting future policy making choices, are also transforming our common 
concepts of health, illness, nature and culture. The traditional balance between the 
natural and biological, on the one hand, and the social and the cultural, on the other 
hand, is shifting towards a new understanding of human identity, in which the biological, 
and more specifically the genetical, is acquiring a growing importance (Glasner 2004; 
Glasner and Rothman 2004). The possibility of intervening into the genetic makeup of 
living organisms is transforming the traditional concept of a fixed and immutable nature 
into a new definition in which the biological and the social mutually constitute each 
other, through reciprocal intervention. Whilst social and cultural priorities shapes 
genetic research and intervention, the latter, in turn, come to influence and reinforce 
given social and cultural priorities. In fact, science and technology can be interpreted as 
the result of a process of co-production in which social, political and scientific actors 
interact and finally determine the directions, the priorities and the advances of the 
scientific activity. In a sense, technology innovation and cultural transformation 
permanently constitute each other, always reflecting the priority choices of the specific 
society in which these changes take place (Jasanoff 2004).  
Within this framework, health is increasingly being framed as an ideal state of 
freedom from disease, the predominant causes of which are seen to be due to ‘faults’ in 
the human genome (Pavone 2006). In turn, the environmental – including the social, the 
political and the cultural – factors which predispose to disease, such as working 
conditions, pollution, adequate healthcare, diet and living habits, tend to be ignored or 
assigned secondary importance. The trasformation of the current concept of health and 
illness inevitably affects the corresponding conception and structure of the healthcare 
system. The latter has been often reframed in terms of choice healthcare, a definition 
that emphasises individual responsibilities, choices and actions and tends to downplay 
the importance and the role of the public welfare provisions. In addition, the new 
genetic screening technologies promise the close delivery of a ‘personalised’ medicine, 
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that is medical treatments specifically tailored to the unique genetic profile of the 
patient (Royal Society 2005). The emphasis on individual choice and personalised 
medicine, in turn, reinforces the neoliberal approach to the governance of genetic 
technologies in the sense that it proposes the liberalisation of genetic medical products 
as the necessary condition for a ‘successful illness management’ of the individuals 
(Frank 1995). Ultimately, the emphasis on self-management encourages direct-to-
comsumer marketing of genetic screening tests, even when their clinical utility is not 
entirely clear. In the UK, the Genewatch has raised concerns about unregulated genetic 
testing (GeneWatch 2002) and the OECD is about to issue specific guidelines for safe 
and reliable use and delivery of genetic testing (forthcoming 2007).    
  Although not necessarily leading to a resurgence of racism, there is evidence 
suggesting that the new genetic technologies and findings may also affect our traditional 
understanding of race, ethnicity and identity. Although he acknowledges the increasing 
connection between science and race discourse, Skinner suggests that this connection 
may not necessarily imply a resurgence of scientific racism. In his opinion, the genetic 
findings have provoked the emergence of a more complex phenomenon, namely 
biologism, in which the concept of race increasingly incorporates cultural and ethnical 
elements whilst the concept of ethnic identity gradually encompasses genetic and 
biological information. This complex interaction may actually give raise to a new 
biopolitics of identity, as the boom of genetic tests to establish biological ancestry or to 
support ethnic claims demonstrates (D. Skinner, 2006)   
Finally, on the 29th of April 2006, the US Case Law School received 773.000 
dollars to “develop guidelines for the use of human subjects in what could be the next 
frontier in medical technologies: genetic enhancement” (Mitchel & Hook, 2006).  
Consequently, Huxley was probably right when he argued that it was not really feasible 
to liberalise eugenics practices without involving public authorities in the promotion of 
their development as well as in their regulation. The transformations triggered by these 
technologies may be so remarkable that they certainly require a consistent and 
centralised effort to steer them into the right direction. Therefore, there is evidence to 
believe that eventually the state and its redistributive system will be involved in 
regulating provision of and access to the biotechnologies. If this proved true, the entire 
philosophical construction of Agar would collapse. It would demonstrate that the 
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utopian dream associated with eugenics necessarily imply the transformation of our 
society into a new one, substantially different from the one in which we live today.  
In sum, Agar’s liberal eugenic utopia suffers from internal inconsistency because 
it assumes a compatibility between liberal democracy and eugenics that not only is 
theoretically untenable but also empirically flawed. If we truly liberalise eugenics, 
polarisation and discrimination will drive the society to a point in which current social 
bonds and collective solidarity will collapse. They might well encourage the emergence 
of a new society, but it will be a radically different society.  I admit that it is difficult to 
imagine how our conceptions of health care, political participation, family and 
reproduction, social structures and even sport activity will change, but it is not difficult 
to realise that they will indeed change.   
On the other hand, if we accept the introduction of social and political 
intervention the very basic notion of liberal eugenics collapse to the ground, leaving the 
door open to a state-regulated eugenics. The state may not need to impose eugenic 
criteria, as Huxley advocated, but it will be certainly involved in choosing what to allow 
and what to prohibit, what to subside and what to keep accessible to private out-of-
pocket expenses. If we allow humanity to begin operating at both the environmental and 
the genetic level, it does not make sense to keep social and political structures dealing 
with the environmental transformations whilst leaving genetic transformations entirely 
in private hands. The risk is that, at some point, the two trends may find each other 
entirely at odds, thereby provoking either a social collapse or the re-adaptation of the 
social structure to the new genetic context (or vice-versa).  
  
Conclusion 
Science, eugenics and utopia  
 
Having dealt with the differences between the two utopias, I can now move on to 
the conclusion. Although Huxley and Agar write in a very different period and arrive at 
different conclusions, there are interesting similarities between the two accounts of 
eugenics. My argument was that these similarities derive neither from a common 
philosophical background, nor from a direct influence of the former on the latter. Both 
the secular humanist Huxley and the liberal Agar come to consider eugenics, and the 
social and physical changes associated with it, as the privileged way to achieve the 
realisation of a perfect society. The political ideologies underpinning the two eugenic 
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societies differ substantially because of the divergence in the priority list of values the 
two philosophers hold.  
Therefore, the common objective of pursuing the perfection of the human 
condition, not only in its physical traits but also in its social and environmental features, 
requires a different explanation. The common utopian horizon may derive not so much 
from direct similarities between the two authors but from the utopian dimension that has 
been sustaining so far science in general and medical and reproductive technology in 
particular. This dimension comes to the fore, for instance, when we compare the two 
accounts of human evolution, which look very similar and derive directly from the 
theory of evolution elaborated by the French philosophers in the nineteenth century. 
Obviously, this common utopian horizon has been embodied and expressed in different 
ways throughout the last four centuries, depending on the dominant political ideology of 
the time. Consequently, it does not look strange that Huxley proposed eugenics in a 
context of social planning and collective internationalism whilst Agar has recently 
reformulated eugenics in a context of liberalism, individualism and market economy.  
Whether through the social action of an international system of governance, as 
Huxley suggested, or through a radical liberalisation in the individualistic market 
economy, as Agar advocates, eugenics keeps being one of the most important topics of 
the contemporary political agenda.  Although incarnated in various and often opposite 
ideological frameworks, the eugenic utopian dream of perfection keeps sustaining the 
scientific advances and its technological developments. Ever since the philosophers of 
the scientific revolution came to accept that science and medicine existed to change and 
improve the world, eugenics has not ceased to be an inspiring dream as well as a tragic 
nightmare. And today, we find again ourselves proclaiming the importance of eugenics 
to achieve the ‘good life’. I quote: 
 
‘Liberal eugenics proposes that these (reproductive) technologies be 
used to dramatically enlarge reproductive choices. Prospective parents may 
ask genetic engineers to introduce into their embryos combinations of genes 
that correspond with their particular conception of good life. Yet, they will 
acknowledge the right of their fellow citizens to make completely difference 
eugenics choices.” (N. Agar, 2004:  6) 
 
The problem, really, is not so much that people may be allowed to make 
different eugenic choices. Rather, the problem is the idea that in order to achieve ‘a 
good life’ they might need to make eugenics choices.  
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